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George C. Marshall:
An Enduring Model of Leadership Effectiveness
Jack Clarcq
Richard DeMartino
Michael E. Palanski
Authors’ Note: This paper is dedicated to the memory of the exceptional individuals who were interviewed for this
project. The world is a lesser place without them. We give a special thanks to the Marshall Foundation for their support.
Clarcq and DeMartino serve as equal lead authors.

Abstract
General George C. Marshall is universally recognized as a paragon of leadership. Marshall’s effectiveness as
the leader of the U.S. Army during World War II, the State Department during the early post-war era, and
the Defense Department during the Korean War are well known and documented. As a result of his many
accomplishments, a number of researchers and historians have explored traits and factors that underlie
Marshall’s success. While many of these efforts provide insight into Marshall’s leadership style, none employ
original data (interviews) specifically focused on leadership, management, and character. This paper is based
on interviews conducted in 1998 of the last remaining Marshall subordinates. These individuals—Brigadier
General Erle Cocke, Jr., General Andrew J. Goodpaster, General Walter T. Kerwin, Ambassador George
F. Kennan, and Mr. H. Merrill Pasco—were interviewed specifically pertaining to Marshall’s management
and leadership approach. The findings, depicted in this article, outline and map Marshall’s effectiveness in
both personal and organizational leadership.

Introduction
The early 21st century is a period of rapid and
pervasive economic and political changes.
Organizations—both public and private—are
struggling to adapt to these changes and complex
environments with various levels of success.
Exceptional leadership is critical to effectively
address complex organizational challenges.
Today’s political, economic, and business
environments are not unique for their rapid and
pervasive change and associated opportunities

and challenges. The Second World War and the
challenges of the early Cold War period reflect such
times. The challenges faced by the U.S. government
and military were extraordinary. A parochial
and undertrained U.S. Army would grow from
190,000 to over 8,000,000—entailing profound
organizational, cultural, and logistical challenges
(U.S. Center for Military History, 2009a, 2009b).
Similarly, governmental organizations capable of
developing and implementing a robust foreign
policy would have to emerge, which required a
dramatic transformation.
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This article explores the origins and foundations of
General George C. Marshall’s effective leadership
during the pivotal period of WWII and the ensuing
Cold War. George Marshall served as the U.S.
Army chief of staff during WWII and led the rapid
expansion, professionalization, and modernization
of the U.S. Army. During the period after WWII,
Marshall served as secretary of state and later as
secretary of defense, leading the U.S. response to
the expansionist Soviet threat and the rebuilding
of Western Europe. These challenges required
innovative public policy strategies, creative and
innovative organizational development, and above
all, exceptional leadership.
The leadership and accomplishments of General
Marshall, who was referred to by Winston Churchill
as “the architect of victory” and by others as “the
rebuilder of Europe,” were profound and enduring.
Marshall was referred to by renowned management
expert Peter Drucker as one of the greatest leaders
and industrial managers of the twentieth century
(Drucker, 1967, p. 64). Undoubtedly, General
Marshall was an extraordinary individual with
a combination of unique personal qualities that
made him a highly revered and effective leader.
The George C. Marshall Foundation, created
at the suggestion of President Harry S. Truman
in 1953, organized and documented Marshall’s
accomplishments. The foundation’s research library
is replete with an impressive array of information
documenting the general’s life and activities.
Research materials include interviews of Marshall
and his contemporaries, supporting government,
and other data. Drawing on this documentation,
a number of books and articles have defined and
explored General Marshall’s leadership. These
18

efforts, however, did not employ data (particularly
interviews) that specifically sought to understand
his leadership and character as a public servant.
This paper is based on original unpublished
data collected exclusively to explore the effective
leadership of General Marshall.
One pervasive theme that emerged from these
interviews pertained to the extraordinary character
of General Marshall as exemplified by the virtues
of prudence, a type of practical wisdom which is
farsighted, goal-oriented, and focused on the greater
good, and temperance, a virtue marked by humility
and self-regulation (Peterson & Seligman, 2004).
Perhaps the most interesting and instructive aspect
of Marshall’s virtue was his ability to display it in a
variety of settings: in personal situations, in leading
large organizations, and in dealing with external
stakeholders. Insights from the interviews show that
Marshall was able to act as the polite gentleman, the
stern commander, and the consummate salesman,
all the while maintaining a sense of consistency
and integrity, which are the hallmarks of strong
character (Palanski & Yammarino, 2007).

Interviews
In 1997, the foundation sponsored a research
project to conduct interviews with individuals
who had served with General Marshall during
his time as Army chief of staff, secretary of state,
and later, secretary of defense. Five surviving
individuals who had directly worked with General
Marshall were identified—all have since passed
on. The interviewees, extremely accomplished
and distinguished in their own right, were
interviewed regarding Marshall’s leadership and
management characteristics.

The Journal of Character & Leadership Integration
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1949855

Marshall

The five interviewees interacted with Marshall early
in their careers; two served as direct reports. The
remainder interacted directly with him but reported
to higher-level Marshall subordinates. The group
was diverse: two interviewees were career military
officers who later achieved the status of fourstar general (General Andrew J. Goodpaster and
General Walter T. Kerwin); one became a successful
corporate attorney (Mr. H. Merrill Pasco); another
was a renowned diplomat, historian, and political
scientist (Ambassador George F. Kennan); and
one was a prominent public and private consultant
(Brigadier General Erle Cocke, Jr.). Each
interviewee enjoyed a unique relationship with
General Marshall during his tenures as Army chief
of staff, secretary of state, and secretary of defense.
(An outline of the interviewees’ background and
interactions with General Marshall are provided in
Appendix 1.)
Prior to conducting the study, a literature review
was conducted based on previous Marshall-related
interviews, documents, and research located in
the Marshall Foundation archives. Next, a semistructured questionnaire was developed exploring
the nature of such factors as management style,
delegation, leadership characteristics, character
traits, and approaches to alliances. This approach
was consistent with Draft and Lewin (1990), who
drew attention to the need to reorient research
away from a tendency to incrementally develop
conclusions footnote by footnote. The interviews
were conducted from November 1997 to April
1998. The data, insights and stories gleaned from
those interviewed, were derived from a retrospective
understanding of General Marshall. For example,
Generals Goodpaster and Kerwin were four-star

generals and not only remembered their service
with General Marshall, but also recalled how his
leadership philosophy, wisdom, and organizational
insights influenced the Army and military
throughout the remainder of the twentieth century.
In many ways this paper serves as a celebration of
the insights and stories of the extraordinary men
and heroes involved in this study. For this reason,
and to avoid repeating previous analysis, this paper
emphasizes the insights developed from the original
interview data. This paper’s findings, while guided
by previous Marshall research, are not intended to
be comprehensive, but are original in exploring the
nature of Marshall’s leadership and character.

Findings
Two major themes emerged from the data related
to Marshall’s unique leadership style—his personal
leadership effectiveness and organizational
leadership effectiveness. These themes were based
on a combination of attributes not aligned with a
specific trait or context, but are more reflective of
overall character.

Theme I: Personal Effectiveness
Marshall’s personal effectiveness was grounded in
his basic understanding of the role of leadership, a
highly structured work environment, and his ability
to make quick yet informed decisions. Marshall was
unique because he stayed out of most tactical decisions.
He created “structured environments” within his
organizations that were complementary to his work
routines and that facilitated speedy and informed
decision making. Marshall’s personal effectiveness
was also magnified by a persona that enabled him to
control his emotions and display high levels of personal
Volume 2 | Issue 1 | Fall 2011

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1949855

19

integrity, placing the public good over personal
aspirations.
One powerful message extracted from the
interviews concerned General Marshall’s unique
ability to remove himself from the temptation to
micromanage or become involved in non-essential
decisions. Retired Generals Andrew Goodpaster
and Walter Kerwin, accustomed to the challenges
of command, independently identified Marshall’s
ability to remove himself from non-command
decisions. When asked how General Marshall
differed from other successful generals and leaders,
Andrew Goodpaster paused for a moment and
observed, “Marshall differed from other generals in
that he kept himself out of most [tactical] decisions.
It was not that he was uninterested; it was that he
was disinterested in the sense of having no special
interests” (A. Goodpaster, personal communication,
February 10, 1998). General Kerwin supported this
example of prudence:
He focused on the big-picture issues and
problems and left the details to others. I’ve
known quite a few other [high-level] officers
who got caught up in details, and they lost
the big-picture focus of their objectives.… He
mainly wanted to know what the [big-picture]
problems were, that is, what’s going on. He
always asked [about] major issues and questions
[that were related to such issues]. (W. Kerwin,
personal communication, March 20, 1998)
George Kennan observed that Marshall’s efforts as
secretary of state were focused almost exclusively on
large-picture issues associated with surveying the
new world situation, developing recommendations
and building political support.
20
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He asked them [senior-level subordinates] to
refrain from bothering him beyond the minimal
unavoidable degree with demands that would
distract his attention from the major diplomatic
problems… which he had been appointed [to
address]. In the major matters that preoccupied
him, he had a limited amount of time at his
disposal. And he was very good and very firm in
deciding what was of first importance and what
was not. (G. Kennan, personal communication,
January 29, 1998)
Earl Cocke (personal communication, April 29,
1998) also observed that Marshall wanted most
[nonstrategic] issues handled at lower levels.
Freed from lower-level decision making,
Marshall could build his personal effectiveness
around structured environments that allowed
for strict personal work routines, concise and
direct information flows, limited internal access,
and accelerated decision making, which were
appropriate to the war and early Cold War eras. As
an example of self-regulation, Merrill Pasco noted
Marshall’s highly structured daily routine:
He got to the office at 8:00, he had a presentation
from the Operations Division of the activities
of the night before—very well done, very
articulate officers—and then he had whatever
appointments with staff heads that had been
requested. Then, about 11:00, he had a period
of time when he could see people outside, but
you didn’t make any appointments without his
approval. And they ranged from all sorts of
people in the Congress and in industry, from
Mr. Bernard Baruch to John Martin, who was
president of Pennsylvania Railroad. He left at

Marshall

lunch to go to Fort Myers, had lunch with Mrs.
Marshall—took five minutes to get there—he
was back after a short nap, which he could
always take very easily, and then he worked until
about 4:30. He spent a lot of time reviewing
the requests from the field and reviewing staff
studies that were presented to him. He had a
very strict schedule, and he had a lot of balls
in the air. (M. Pasco, personal communication,
November 11, 1997)
George Kennan described a similar work routine
while Marshall served at the Department of State.
He added that he did not work weekends, which
were reserved for his wife and family, and as a
result “it was very difficult to engage him during
weekends” (G. Kennan, personal communication,
January 29, 1998). Kennan further hypothesized
that Marshall’s work-hour limitations were largely
influenced by his advanced age, but this analysis
was not noted by Pasco (who worked with Marshall
several years earlier). Pasco observed that Marshall
made great distinctions between work and off
times—implicitly for effectiveness. Marshall had a
familiar saying that “nobody had an original thought
after 2:00” (M. Pasco, personal communication,
November 11, 1997).
Marshall’s daily routines were tightly controlled by
his chief of staff, who limited internal access. Both
Pasco and Kennan noted that only very seniorlevel subordinates had open access to Marshall, a
privilege they did not abuse. Kennan recalled,
Access to him… was very closely controlled,
largely in the tactful and highly competent
hands of custodian of his outer office… Colonel
(later General) Carter. He always was prepared, I

think, to receive officials of the department when
they asked to see him. But he did not like anyone
coming to see him to pass the day or to expose
him to problems that people had been unable to
agree upon at lower levels. (G. Kennan, personal
communication, January 29, 1998)
Pasco observed a similar process, noting, “You had
access and came to discuss an issue or you didn’t come
in” (M. Pasco, personal communication, November
11, 1997). Kennan, analyzing the role of Marshall’s
gatekeepers, continued, “I personally thought at the
time, and remain of that opinion today, that the
restraints on access to him were… wise ones. In the
major matters… he had limited time at his disposal,
and he was very good and very firm in deciding
what was of first importance and what was not” (G.
Kennan, personal communication).
Marshall was particularly galled when valuable time
and energy were wasted on internal bureaucratic or
petty issues. Goodpaster recalled,
Colonel Lincoln [Goodpaster’s supervising
officer] came back and said that he had never
seen General Marshall so upset—red in the
face and very tense. Marshall apparently told a
small group, “I want to tell you what I’ve been
doing for the last hour. I’ve been deciding which
lieutenant general’s wife lives in which lieutenant
general’s quarters.” That type of political busy
work disturbed him very much. (A. Goodpaster,
personal communication, February 10, 1998)
Marshall sought to be well informed of major
changes and events, but also sought to keep all
meetings and communications as brief and concise
as possible. The interviews revealed a number of
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mechanisms and routines to achieve this objective.
Kerwin described his operational briefings to
Marshall as very short, between 15 and 20 minutes:
In essence, what he wanted was to know what
happened, and what went wrong and the
problems that existed. He didn’t want a dog
and pony show… I’ll always remember how the
general would question people in briefings and
other discussions…. He would ask, “Why do
you say that?” many times during the meeting.
(W. Kerwin, personal communication, March
20, 1998)
In another example of prudence, Pasco also noted
Marshall’s well-known and invariable rule that
all memos and reports had to contain a one-page
summary. “He said if you can’t place the situation
or solution in one page you hadn’t thought it out”
(M. Pasco, personal communications, November
11, 1997). Most activities that were not productive
were avoided. Pasco (personal communication)
observed that outside of the joint chiefs of staff
meetings, he never recalled Marshall participating
in roundtable meetings. Marshall felt these types of
activities were a waste of time.
Marshall structured meetings and reports to quickly
access information and analysis. He also demanded
that his staff possess a thorough understanding
of the underlying issues related to the situations.
Marshall used this information to make quick
and effective decisions. Goodpaster recounted an
experience with Colonel Maxwell Taylor which
involved two major generals in disagreement:
Marshall read through this and finally said,
“Well,…Taylor, what do you think I should do?”
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And Taylor said, “Well sir, I haven’t thought
about it.” Marshall handed it back to him and
said, “Please do so.” Taylor said, “He never
had to say that to me again.” (A. Goodpaster,
personal communication, February 10, 1998)
At times, Kerwin noted, “[Marshall] would review
a summary… he would send it back to the group
and say, ‘Find out A, B, and C for me.’ And then
when it came back he would make a decision and
move on to the next issue” (W. Kerwin, personal
communication, March 20, 1998).
While Marshall’s personal effectiveness was
positively impacted by his routines and structured
environment, much was also based on his personal
wisdom. His ability to make effective decisions and
retain large amounts of information, along with
his self-confidence, formed the core of his success.
Goodpaster stated succinctly,
[He was able to] get to the heart of a problem
to comprehend complex issues and put them
in an orderly fashion. He had the ability and
guts to make hard decisions and to carry good
decisions to fruition, even in the face of strong
opposition. He also had a unique [personal]
ability to balance and prioritize complex issues
in order to respond to them. (A. Goodpaster,
personal communications, February 10, 1998)
Goodpaster recounted a story shared with
him by Eisenhower while he was president.
Eisenhower was tasked with providing overall
strategic recommendations for winning the war.
He determined, through detailed analysis, that
Germany would be our first strategic target because
with additional time, the Germans could both defeat
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the Soviet Union and capture the Suez Canal. From
this analysis, and other analysis, Marshall quickly
concluded that the US should defeat Germany
first. Even there, though Marshall faced political
repercussion for this plan, he moved to implement.
In major decisions, Marshall listened to all sides
of an issue but sought to avoid protracted debate.
The interviews suggest he was critical of too many
issues reaching his office without a consensus from
his senior leadership staff. Kerwin noted that “He
wanted to know what they recommended, and [for
important command issues] he would make the
decision” (W. Kerwin, personal communications,
March, 20, 1998). Summarizing the structure of
Marshall’s policy meetings, Cocke observed, He
would… start the meeting with “We’re here to
make a decision on this [issue]. I’d like to hear from
the opposition here and the proponents here.” And
he’d let each one talk three to five minutes. Then
the decision would be made. (E. Cocke, personal
communication, April 29, 1998)
Cocke later observed that Marshall was “[critical
of ] Roosevelt during the war for allowing too many
things [lower level issues] to come to him without
a consensus” (E. Cocke, personal communication,
April 29, 1998). Once Marshall made a decision,
all of his subordinates were required to support that
decision, but he carefully reflected on the competing
opinions prior to making a decision.
Marshall respected subordinates who could provide
advice and even dissent prior to a decision. In this
manner, he appreciated subordinates who could
disagree with his analysis—reminiscent of some of
Marshall’s earlier military experiences. Marshall’s
admonishment of General Omar Bradley and

other junior officers in 1939 was well known. After
joining the Army secretariat in 1939, Bradley and
his cohort were called into Marshall’s office, where
they heard his displeasure for their lack of insight
and independent thinking: “You haven’t disagreed
with a single thing I had done all week.… Unless I
hear all the arguments against something I am not
sure whether I’ve made the right decision or not”
(Bradley and Blair, 1983, pp. 83-84). Marshall is
also recorded as having admonished Eisenhower for
not disagreeing with him more forcefully: “When
you disagree with my point of view, say so, without
an apologetic approach” (Pogue, 1993b, p. 410).
The interviews suggest a strong relationship
between Marshall’s professional style—widely
viewed as austere and impersonal—and his personal
productivity. Pasco noted that Marshall intentionally
created a firewall between his professional and
personal lives:
On trips and on many other occasions, he
would ask about families, but only during offduty times. Whenever you were with him away
from when he was performing his duties, he
was interested in your family and children and
what they were doing. When he made tours,
however, he would focus on military training
and the adequacy of supplies.… He did not
mix [personal interest in others]; he did that
separately. (M. Pasco, personal communication,
November 11, 1997)
While this approach is widely credited as a
“command face” by many, it was viewed by the
interviewees as, in part, a productivity mechanism.
Younger officers interacting with Marshall were
both in awe and “scared as hell” of him. As Kerwin,
Volume 2 | Issue 1 | Fall 2011 23

Pasco, and Goodpastor described, no one wanted
to displease him. Marshall’s time and energy were
dedicated to high-level efforts during WWII
and later at the State and Defense Departments.
Kennan said, “I cannot recall ever seeing him go
very far from his office [at] the Department of
State. He stayed there, by himself, and dealt with
the people he thought it his duty to deal with”
(personal communication, January 29, 1998).
Kennan (personal communication, January 29,
1998) further mentioned a story where Department
of State officials were chasing after Marshall as
he was leaving for the day. Marshall completely
ignored them.
General Marshall’s personal effectiveness was
based in large part on his temperance, that is, his
ability to be in control of his feelings, moods, and
impulses. He viewed anger as fatal and exhausting.
Pasco noted continually throughout the interview
Marshall’s self-control and paraphrased the
comments he heard firsthand:
He would say, “I cannot allow myself to get
angry, it would be fatal; it is too exhausting
and too time consuming,” [and he] recognized
the [potentially] adverse impact of emotions
on decision making… “Don’t be a deep feeler
and poor thinker,” that sort of thing. He’d just
say, “Don’t let the emotions wrangle and whirl
in you. Get to the bottom of it and make a
decision.” (M. Pasco, personal communication,
November 11, 1997)
Cocke added that he had witnessed Marshall
unhappy with subordinates’ work, but noted that
Marshall was sensitive to them, “never admonishing
anyone in front of somebody else” (E. Cock,
24
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personal communication, April 29, 1998). Kerwin
recalled that
He didn’t overly react. I never saw him get mad
in a briefing or meeting. I could tell when he
wasn’t pleased by his steely blue eyes and body
language. He got mad when you didn’t give him
what he wanted. I never saw him overly mad,
just irritated. The general… didn’t get mad in
the sense that a lot of people do when they
get frustrated, sort of shooting off, pounding
the desk, or something like that. He never
got exasperated, and he never used any bad
language, always polite. (W. Kerwin, personal
communication, March 20, 1998)
Pasco observed a number of other things, besides
poor performance, that frustrated General Marshall:
[Marshall got mad at verbosity, people talking
too much… long-winded reports, anything
that wasn’t concise and right to the point. And
people that were unjustly critical of what the
Army was doing—that used to outrage him a
great deal. Of course he saw a lot of that, and
he’d often write a Congressman and inquire
about something that he read in the paper that
he disagreed with. Those sorts of things made
him mad. (M. Pasco, personal communication,
November 11, 1997)
An essential aspect of General Marshall’s personal
productivity was the quality of placing the public
good above any personal interest, thus exemplifying
prudence and integrity. His selflessness, combined
with his demand for excellence, motivated and
sometimes frightened those around him. As
Pasco observed, “We wanted to please him” (M.
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Pasco, personal communication, November 11,
1997). Each of the interviewees hinted at being
in awe of General Marshall—awe based on his
superior judgment, demeanor, and selflessness.
Paul Hoffman, head of the European Cooperation
Administration, observed, “I have never known
anyone who in my opinion was as completely
selfless as George Marshall was in the handling
of any problem. I don’t think he ever gave it any
thought as to how this would affect George
Marshall” (Nitze, 1993, p. 8). Sexton stated, “I feel
that George Marshall is just one notch below Jesus
Christ” (Pogue, 1958c).

Theme II: Organizational Effectiveness
Marshall viewed organizational effectiveness through
a holistic lens. Organizational effectiveness was
facilitated by decentralized organizational structures
and outstanding subordinates. He set overall strategy
and priorities and allowed his subordinates to carry out
those activities. Marshall provided subordinates with
both authority and autonomy, but in return demanded
clarity of thought, calculated risk-taking, and
accountability. His organizational effectiveness was
also related to his concern for building morale and keen
ability to sum up political situations with important
stakeholders and act accordingly.
Marshall possessed a holistic view of an effective
organization. For Marshall, well-organized
structures and competent and empowered
subordinates were required for effective operations.
As General Kerwin observed toward the beginning
of his interview, “If you’re looking for a real
management forte, he reorganized the Army so that
it could respond quickly and he picked the best and
brightest for leadership roles” (W. Kerwin, personal

communication, March 20, 1998). Effective and
responsive command/organizational structures
and people management skills were the themes
that emerged throughout the interviews. Marshall
clearly understood the importance of clear reporting
lines. He also strongly emphasized delegation and
accountability among subordinates. In all cases he
expected and demanded that all members of his
organizations put forth their best efforts. Given the
complex realities of the milieu in which he served,
these actions were exceptionally prudent.
Generals Kerwin and Goodpaster, both
accomplished and experienced military leaders,
provided the greatest insights into Marshall’s
organizational effectiveness. Marshall’s welldocumented Army re-organization of 1939 was
central to their views on how he approached
organizational effectiveness. As an insider, he was
painfully aware of the difficulties associated with
process and people and how these factors could
adversely impact the U.S. Army during a critical
period in history. When asked about Marshall’s
abilities, General Kerwin’s observation was about
his understanding how to organize. “He was a great
organizer. I think the most important change he
made when he became chief of staff right before
the war was to reorganize the Army. He realized
that the existing Army structure was not conducive
to fast work” (W. Kerwin, personal communication,
March 20, 1998). Goodpaster added, “The whole
place was ossified before the reorganization, and
that is why the restructuring had to occur” (personal
communication, February 10, 1998). Marshall’s
long Army career provided ample evidence
that organizational fiefdoms and ineffective
commanders created an organization that could
Volume 2 | Issue 1 | Fall 2011 25

plan voluminously but not act. Marshall served as
a reformer and innovator, breaking up bureaucratic
fiefdoms that sought authority and influence for the
sake of personal power.
Marshall’s view of organization effectiveness,
however, was more than just the organization and
process. He was renowned as a master manager
of subordinates. The interviews revealed both
Marshall’s vision of command and his ability to
implement that vision within a large, complex
organization. Regarding the military context,
Kerwin stated it very succinctly: “He was an
outstanding commander and leader” (W. Kerwin,
personal communication, March 20, 1998).
While history notes Marshall’s mastery over
delegation and people, what is less certain is
what exactly this means. Interviews suggest that
Marshall’s approach was unique, not so much
because of its objectives, but due to his ability to
implement them. He identified the most talented
individuals for critical roles, granted them
authority, and then held them accountable for
their success and failures. Goodpaster, speaking
from the perspective of military history, observed
that “Marshall had a reputation in the Army
of being a free thinker and internal reformer”
(personal communication, February 10, 1998).
He was deadly opposed to the highly documented
decision making that was currently employed by
the U.S. Army. Goodpaster continued, “[Marshall]
conducted a running battle with the commanders
of the general staff school in Leavenworth, which
was addicted to voluminous and ponderous
plans and techniques” (personal communication,
February 10, 1998).
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In another example of wisdom, Marshall’s ability to
identify and advance talented young officers in the
Army is well known. When asked what Marshall
did best as a leader, Pasco, without hesitation, stated,
“judge people’s abilities” (personal communication,
November 11, 1997).
The people equation was essential for Marshall.
He identified and selected talented subordinates.
Equally significant was Marshall’s willingness
to remove those subordinates who were not
performing up to expectations. Once he became
secretary of the Army, Marshall began a painful
replacement of older officers with younger,
highly talented officers. These older officers were
Marshall’s contemporaries, and such removals
and retirements were personally painful. Pasco
described the situation as “difficult and painful for
Marshall” (personal communication, November
11, 1997). Marshall’s willingness to remove
subordinates, however, was not limited to officers
of his generation. Any officer or subordinate who
was not achieving his objectives would be removed.
Pasco describes several of these circumstances:
I saw him relieve three officers at Fort Jackson
one day. He just saw the condition of those
divisions, and he knew how long they’d been
there and he thought it ought to be better, and
somebody else would just have to get this corps
in shape. He thought, they’re going overseas
soon, and they’re not ready. He just saw that.
Other times he’d get reports from the head of
the armored force or whoever was handling the
infantry divisions. They’d ask to have people
reassigned and relieved, and of course, if they
were of general officer level and in command
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of a division, the chief of staff had to approve
the change. So he did it himself, but he got
a lot of information too. And he could tell
from the reports, efficiency reports and from
the maneuver reports, which divisions were
moving along and which weren’t. He’d find out
why and order their relief real quick. (personal
communication, November 11, 1997)
Supporting this philosophy, Goodpaster noted
that Eisenhower often mentioned that Marshall
had “encouraged him to cut the deadwood”
(personal communication, February 10, 1998).
Interestingly, Marshall assigned authority based
upon performance. Pasco’s interview, in particular,
was replete with his perspectives on those
subordinates who the general personally enjoyed
and those he did not. In all cases he treated his
subordinates with respect and gave authority to
those with the greatest ability. Pasco noted,
There was no great love lost, but General
Marshall respected MacArthur. He always
called every officer by their last name,
including McNair… you name them all,
except George Patton… But whenever he
referred to MacArthur, he always said “that
fellow MacArthur.” McCarthy always told me
that that’s the code word for “SOB.” (personal
communications, November 11, 1997)
There were close subordinates with whom
Marshall would occasionally socialize, and others
with whom he would not. Even so, his personal
likes and dislikes did not count within the office—
he found and promoted the best and brightest.

While Marshall was a taskmaster by any standard,
he delegated significant authority and autonomy
to subordinates, especially to theatre commanders.
Marshall’s view of tying authority to accountability
was the essence of his leadership philosophy.
Goodpaster said, “I used to speak with Eisenhower,
often late in the afternoon, when he was President
and I was working with him as staff secretary. On a
number of occasions he stated that Marshall taught
him the finer points of how to decentralize and
delegate” (personal communication, February 10,
1998). Based on his broad experience as a general
and commander, Kerwin observed that it is often
difficult for a commander not to get caught up in
details; however, Marshall did not do this (W.
Kerwin, personal communication, March 20, 1998).
At the Department of State, Kennan also observed
a similar pattern of Marshall granting authority to
subordinates but holding them accountable (G.
Kennan, personal communication, January 29, 1998).
The interviews provided a number of examples
of General Marshall’s granting of support and
authority to subordinates. Goodpaster observed
that
The earliest point of guidance provided to
me was that General Marshall did not try to
conduct military operations out of Washington,
DC. He did not attempt to run the operational
aspects of the war, but rather, he looked to the
theatre commanders to do that. I was told if
an officer took a proposed directive in to the
General Marshall that told Eisenhower or
MacArthur just what to do, he would ask, “What
does General Eisenhower [or MacArthur] say
about this?” And if he was told, “I don’t know,”
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then he would say, “Well, I think you had better
find out.” And if the same man did it twice,
he would say, “Get rid of that man” (personal
communication, February 10, 1998).
He later provided a number of examples, two of
which are cited below. The first was told to him
by Eisenhower, the second he witnessed when
Marshall served as secretary of defense under
President Truman.
Eisenhower told me a story about Marshall
visiting him during the North Africa campaign.
When the operations in North Africa had been
successfully completed, Marshall made a trip
over to speak to Eisenhower… to congratulate
him on his accomplishment.… Eisenhower said
that one thing that he wanted to tell Marshall
was that he was very much appreciative of
an instruction that Marshall had sent him…
that no American officer who served under
Eisenhower’s command was sent unless he
wanted them there. And Eisenhower said, “I
appreciated that greatly.” General Marshall then
stood back a moment, thought about it, and
said, “Yes, Eisenhower, but it was more than
that. If you had failed, you would not have had
that as an excuse.” (A. Goodpaster, personal
communication, February 10, 1998)
And [Marshall’s propensity to delegate and
empower] was not just limited to his role as the
Army’s chief of staff during the war. I remember
when Marshall served as secretary of defense near
the end of his career. At the time, I was working
on Eisenhower’s staff, which was attempting to
establish NATO’s nuclear command. General
Gunther, Eisenhower’s chief of staff, was the
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man charged with making that happen. In
order to get the operation established as soon as
possible, we tended to staff the command with
individuals who had performed similar duties
during the war. There was this one individual we
desperately needed for the Military Assistance
Program (a program that provided military
equipment to NATO allies needing to build
up their arms). We asked [Brigadier General
Frank] Bogart and later his chief, Major General
Stanley Scott, to have this man reassigned.
Bogart, however, didn’t want to give him up.
So as reported to me, Major General Stanley
Scott wrote a memo to General Marshall… a
very good memo, stating the case really well…
Marshall sent back with one line: “It is my policy
at this time to give General Eisenhower anyone
he needs—GCM.” (A. Goodpaster, personal
communication, February 10, 1998)
Another time, Goodpaster recalled Lincoln
returning from a meeting with Marshall where
he stated, “General Marshall reminded us again
that man is made for action. He asked what
action we recommend that we should take”
(personal communication, February 10, 1998).
Kerwin, a young Lieutenant Colonel at the time,
repeated throughout the interview that one of
Marshall’s distinguishing characteristics was how
intensely he would question subordinates as to
their thought process and facts. He described
the events in a meeting during the war that he
remembered vividly. It was the only time he
witnessed any hint of General Marshall not
receiving the insights he expected.
I sat in on the first series of briefings for [potential]
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military landings in Japan. I was mainly there
because my boss was unavailable, and there
were always some important questions about
landing craft availability. During that meeting,
I was sitting with all the generals and junior
officers. General Marshall asked a whole series of
questions on landing crafts. After about the third
or fourth question, it was quite obvious that the
group (General Hull, six to eight other generals,
and a host of lesser ranking officers) didn’t have
the answers. I will always remember that meeting:
General Marshall looked around the room, and
everyone got up and filed out. It was like a death
knell. When we [the lower ranking officers] left
the meeting, I was pretty sure that all hell broke
loose because he was very unhappy with the
outcome of the meeting. (W. Kerwin, personal
communications, March 20, 1998)
Kerwin and Goodpaster also remarked on the
latitude they possessed when working in the
Operational Division during the war. While neither
was directly supervised by Marshall, their efforts
were no more than two levels from Marshall’s
watchful eye. Kerwin joked that “I had more [real]
power as a lieutenant colonel in the operation
division than as vice chairman [of the joint chiefs
of staff ]” (personal communication, March 20,
1998). He recounted various stories where he led
initiatives, including the establishment of a UK
Command and leading an international training
initiative involving radar equipment. Each initiative
went to Marshall for review. Goodpaster also
described projects where he and his group received
high levels of authority and autonomy. One was the
release of the deadly variable-timed (VT) fuse antiaircraft weapon for land-based operations. The VT

fuse had been employed on water during the war
with deadly effects to destroy enemy aircraft, but
it had never been used where the Germans could
pick up the VT fuse and reproduce it. Goodpaster
played a major role in the study and the later release
of this weapon for land-based operations.
Perhaps the most important aspect of Marshall’s
leadership was to unlock the potential of
subordinates to thrive in uncertain environments.
This insight was identified by Goodpaster, Kerwin,
and Pasco—those who interacted with him during
the complex and uncertain years following Pearl
Harbor. Goodpaster was most explicit in explaining
what Marshall sought from his subordinates:
Marshall didn’t expect perfection from his
subordinates. He knew that in times of war
both sides were going to be caught by surprise.
He was unique because he demanded that
his people prepare for and quickly respond
to surprises so that no event or series of
events would be catastrophic. He demanded
commanders take calculated and well thought
out risks. MacArthur going into Leyte without
air cover was a good example of the type of risks
that Marshall encouraged. The whole operation
was a big risk but probably shortened the war by
six months to a year. (personal communication,
March 10, 1998)
The observations of the interviewees, referencing
Marshall’s frequent quizzing and demand for
intricate and complex decision making, also fit
in this portrait of Marshall’s view of an effective
organization. Creative and dynamic thinking was
expected from the entire organization.
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Marshall’s perception of people in the organization,
however, was much broader than subordinate
performance. He placed great emphasis on morale—
especially when serving as Army chief of staff. At
a student graduation in 1941, he said, “Where
there is high morale… all things are possible;
without it, everything else—planning, preparation,
production—count for naught” (Hambro, 1953).
Pasco, who frequently travelled with Marshall, said,
“The general kept his finger on the Army’s pulse
by frequently visiting Army posts. [Whenever he]
had any break in time he immediately wanted to see
the troops being trained at Fort Jackson and Fort
Bragg” (personal communication, November 11,
1997). On these trips, he questioned soldiers about
what was on their minds. Pasco adds that he “was
interested in the details of the soldier’s life because
that was the basis of good morale. And good
morale was what the Army fought on” (personal
communication, November 11, 1997). Marshall
“was a great believer in doing the right things for
the morale of troops” (personal communication,
November 11, 1997).
Pasco also observed Marshall’s creation of the Army
morale officer, with the rank of brigadier general. The
position was not a career graveyard. Pasco observed,
It was supposed to be an important job. And he
was very insistent on that. He thought that it
was very important [to have people] who were
articulate and capable… not people who were
put there because they couldn’t do anything else.
(personal communication, November 11, 1997)
Much has been written about the success of General
Marshall in his interactions with Presidents Franklin
D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman, Congress,
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the press, and the U.S. Navy. The interviews
suggest a more complex explanation for Marshall’s
effectiveness in working with external stakeholders:
his keen ability to sum up political situations and
nuances and act accordingly. Within these political
environments, he placed great emphasis on forming
and maintaining alliances. In these settings, his
personal embodiment of integrity, public service,
and non-partisanship served him well. Marshall,
as a holistic leader, possessed a strategic vision of
what actions would be most effective and acted
within the existing political environment to achieve
the best outcome. He did so with candor and
integrity in the context in which he operated, but
he displayed considerable savvy and salesmanship
where appropriate. Pasco observed that Marshall
was “one of the greatest salesmen who ever lived
and knew exactly how to approach people… [but]
he rarely used this sales ability inside the Army”
(personal communication, November 11, 1997).
This observation provides considerable insight into
how Marshall interacted with external stakeholders.
The interviews provided a number of stories and
insights on Marshall’s modus operandi with various
external stakeholders while serving as Army chief
of staff and in the Department of Defense. Given
that three of the interviewees worked within the
Operations Division during WWII, the majority of
examples were related to that period and context.
Goodpaster and Pasco described interactions
between Marshall and the U.S. Navy during WWII.
Collaboration and information sharing between
the Army and Navy was of paramount importance
for the war effort, both for effective campaigns
and to present a united front to the president.
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Pasco (personal communication, November 11,
1997) observed that Marshall was keenly aware
that President Roosevelt, an ex-Navy man and
former under-secretary of the Navy, was reputed
to have a bias towards his branch of the military.
While Marshall possessed strategic and tactical
differences with the Navy leadership on waging the
war (especially with prioritizing the German over
the Japanese fronts), he placed great emphasis on
effectively collaborating with Admiral King, the
commander of the U.S. fleet and chief of naval
operations in WWII. Pasco continued,
He made it a point of getting along with the
Navy, made it a point of getting along with
Admiral King. When anything came up, he
would always get up and go to Admiral King’s
office. He “stroked his fur” that way quite often.
And he recognized the importance of the
Marines and the Navy and wanted to cultivate
them, but it was very difficult with King because
King was a very rigid, indoctrinating officer,
with not a lot of small talk and personality,
either… but a very good Naval officer. (personal
communication, November 11, 1997)
Marshall was also well known for his effective
interaction with presidents, Congress, and the press.
He was also known for influencing public opinion.
He clearly understood the unique dynamics of
interacting with these external stakeholders.
Clearly, part of Marshall’s ability to affect outcomes
was based upon the trust he engendered through
the traits/characteristics of competency, strategic
insights, integrity, faithful service, submission to
civilian authority, and his apolitical nature.
In an exercise of practical wisdom, while Marshall

always displayed candor and loyalty to the president,
he also sought to adjust his methods in a way that
would lead to his intended policy objective. For
example, a staff officer came away impressed after
witnessing a method Marshall employed to gain the
president’s support for the Army’s reorganization
and professionalization. FDR always declared
himself a sailor, so Marshall ordered the creation
of a visual consisting of a large cardboard diagram
representing a ship: “Comprising the forward
section, or bow, of the ship was a newly designated
regular army triangular division. Back of that were
two or three square National Guard divisions, and
at the stern were the service elements to support the
forward divisions” (Rosenblum, 1998). By encasing
these organizational facts in a nautical container,
however unrelated the two subjects may have been,
Marshall succeeded in catching FDR’s eye.
Marshall also placed great emphasis on his
relationship with Congress. Pasco noted the
significant effort Marshall dedicated to serving
and effectively interacting with Congress. Pasco,
who handled many Congressional requests, would
continually interact with General Marshall on these
requests with a summation of the request and a
proposed solution. These were issues that Marshall
was keenly interested in personally addressing.
History reveals Congress’s great respect for General
Marshall. Pasco continued,
Congress had great respect for him because of
the way he performed when he went up there…
they were willing to leave him alone. When he
got called to the Congress, he’d get a staff study
that told it all—its outstanding problems and
solutions. He’d read it, but he wouldn’t take it
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with him. And he’d arrive up there, always got
there about two minutes late, so there’d be a…
bit of suspense. He’d say, “You gentlemen want
to talk to me? What do you want to know?” And
after about the fifth question, he’d unload the
staff study on them out of his head. He didn’t
memorize it, but he just had it in his head, and
he had the ability to put it all in a logical way.
He could make a case in the most amazing way
you ever saw. If he believed in something, he
knew how to sell it. And his character just sold
itself.… Congress never doubted his integrity.…
There was no question about whether what he
said was right. If Marshall said it, it was true.
(personal communication, November 11, 1997)
Marshall demonstrated great skill, loyalty, and
integrity in dealing with Congress. As Pasco
described, “When a request [from Congress] was
submitted to Marshall, if it had merit they got
it, if it didn’t he told them no and why” (personal
communication, November 11, 1997). There was no
question that General Marshall’s insight and analysis
were correct. Congress accepted it. Like in his
relationship with the president, Marshall was always
gentlemanly and respectful. Goodpaster added
that Marshall’s persona in Congress was that of a
“straight shooter” who never lied or wasted anyone’s
time (personal communication, February 10, 1998).

Summary
General George C. Marshall stands out as one of
the most effective public servants of the twentieth
century. This paper reported the results of
conversations with the last remaining individuals
who had served and directly interacted with
General Marshall. This cadre provided their stories
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and perceptions of Marshall as a leader, stories that
can be categorized into personal and organizational
effectiveness that derived from Marshall’s character.
Marshall clearly behaved differently within
alternative contextual environments while still
enjoying universal respect as a man of integrity.
Marshall understood the importance of people,
reporting relationships, and organizational
structures that were necessary for an effective
organization. He knew that the power of individual
initiative could be undermined by a bureaucratic
and ossified organizational culture. To change
this, he both radically re-organized the old Army
and empowered his subordinates. Empowered
subordinates, however, are not always competent
and effective subordinates. He provided great
authority, but also great responsibility. Those who
were not effective were removed quickly. Marshall
established structured but flexible environments,
with the delegation of decision making and
adherence to an organization’s mission.
One of the more interesting aspects of General
Marshall was his ability to remove emotion from his
decision-making process while still empathizing and
respecting subordinates. History reveals that among
the most difficult tasks for Marshall were removing
his peer generation from command positions or
passing them over for promotion, but still he did
these things. He removed junior officers who were
not performing. Marshall was also well known for
employing talented and flamboyant individuals,
such as Douglas MacArthur, who he may not have
liked personally but respected. Marshall treated
individuals with honor and respect. The leadership
literature often describes this attribute as “emotional
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intelligence” (Goleman, 1995). One could argue
that Marshall could command others because he
could command himself.
The interviews also suggest that Marshall was a
master at balancing the somewhat contradictory
forces of principle vs. pragmatism. Marshall was a
man of great principle. History reveals his unique
mixture of traits and characteristics, which include
honesty, selflessness, intelligence and a keen ability
to understand complex issues, reverence for the US
constitutional system, and general leadership. On
the other hand, Marshall’s ability to articulate stories
and “sell” his visions as the best policy outcomes
is legendary. Gardner and Laskin (1995) observe
that Marshall’s messages were geared toward and
sensitive to different audiences, but his personal
ethos as a person of integrity and non-partisanship
served him well. Cocke clearly notes that Marshall’s
speeches were related to specific outcomes. In fact,
he was a master at simultaneously demonstrating
integrity and non-partisanship while advancing
his preferred solutions—he was in essence a nonpartisan with strong political skills. He clearly
perceived the intricate complexities of the political
environment. He understood what he could achieve
and what he could not achieve. As his actions with
the Navy demonstrated, he would lose little battles
to gain positive overall outcomes.
Marshall stands out among the full ensemble of
American leaders in the excellence of his direct
leadership in a military institution, in the larger
society, and as a cabinet member with two portfolios.
He assumed power because of his position in an
institution, but he helped redefine that institution
and others by the way he filled his role.
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Appendix 1:
Interview Participant Background
Brigadier General Erle, Cocke, Jr. (1921-2000). Erle
Cocke, Jr. was a renowned WWII hero and public
servant. He collaborated with General Marshall as
national commander of the American Legion (1950) and
later served as a consultant and civilian aide to General
Marshall and the Defense Department. He maintained

another leading general of the twentieth century, served
as an operational briefer in the Operations Division after
being injured in battle during WWII. General Kerwin
was the Army’s second highest-ranking officer in the
mid-1970s and is considered the lead designer of the
all-volunteer army launched in 1973. General Kerwin
retired from the Army with the rank of four-star general.

a relationship with General Marshall after Marshall’s

Ambassador George F. Kennan (1904-2005). Mr. Kennan

retirement from government service.

worked with General Marshall at the State Department

General Andrew J. Goodpaster (1915-2005). General
Goodpaster, a well-known and leading general and
public servant of the twentieth century, served under
General Marshall during WWII and later during his
tenure as secretary of defense. He was assigned to the
Operations Division (formally the War Plans Division)
after being wounded during WWII. There he served
under Colonel G. A. Lincoln and regularly interacted

from 1947 to 1948. Kennan served as a diplomat, scholar,
and foreign policy advisor, is widely recognized as the
early intellectual force behind the “Soviet Containment
Policy,” and was a major contributor to the Marshall Plan.
Working with Marshall, Kennan created, and became
the first director of, the Policy Planning Division within
the Department of State. The Policy Planning Division
served as a strategic think tank for Marshall.

and observed General Marshall. Later, he worked on

Mr. H. Merrill Pasco (1915-2008). Merrill Pasco served

special projects for General Marshall during his tenure

under General Marshall in the Operations Division

as secretary of defense, most notably on Study 360,

throughout WWII. During that time, he served both as

which explored the US’s role in Greece and Turkey.

assistant secretary and then as secretary of the general

General Goodpaster also assisted Marshall in writing his

staff. Mr. Pasco interacted extensively with General

now famous 1953 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech.

Marshall and continued a warm social relationship after

General Goodpaster’s close relationship with President

the war. After leaving the military, he joined the law firm

Eisenhower also serves as a source of rich insights into

now known as Hunton & Williams, based in Richmond,

Marshall’s management and leadership. Goodpaster

VA, where he served as managing partner and later as

served as President Eisenhower’s staff secretary and

senior counsel.

defense liaison officer from 1954 until 1961. During this
time, Eisenhower shared with Goodpaster a variety of
details about serving under General Marshall. General
Goodpaster retired from the Army with the rank of fourstar general.
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General Walter T. Kerwin (1917-2008). General Kerwin,
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